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Abstract 
This study was conducted with the objective of identifying and analyzing the factors that influence group loan 
repayment performance of the beneficiaries of DECSI operating in the manufacturing sector as group owned 
MSEs. Primary data was collected from 34 selected group leaders of the group owned MSEs borrowers by using 
structured questionnaire and depth-interview. A binary logit regression model was used to analyze the group 
related factors, lender related factors, and socio-economic related factor that influence group loan repayment. 
Out of the nine explanatory variables, the six explanatory variables, i.e., group composition, group initiation, 
peer pressure, suitability of repayment period, loan size and external shocks have statistically significant effect 
on loan repayment of the group borrowers; whereas the three explanatory variables, i.e., internal rule and 
regulation, loan supervision, and training have statistically insignificant effect on loan repayment of the group 
borrowers. Therefore, to improve the loan repayment performance of the group borrowers, DECSI, among others,  
should consider homogeneity, self-initiation, existence of peer pressure among members, extent of loan size with 
business plan of group borrowers at the very beginning, and should focus on the repayment challenges which are 
stated by the borrowers (market linkage and loan supervision), and take corrective actions. Finally, further 
research on similar area is suggested by considering factors that need solution such as experience of group 
borrowers in the sector, group size, and lack of land; besides similar study may be conducted in other sectors of 
the MSEs (i.e., construction, urban agriculture, and service and trade) in order to have a holistic understanding of 
about the determinants of group loan repayment performance. 
Keywords:Chi-square, DECSI, Determinant Factors, Group Loan, Logit, Manufacturing Sector, Mekelle, 
Microfinance, MSEs. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this study was to identify factors that determine group loan repayment performance in DECSI 
microfinance institution. Specifically, the study was addressing groups that are engaging in manufacturing sector 
found in Mekelle city. It was attempting to analyze the common assumption that group lending leads to good 
repayment rates by examining what countervailing processes may affect group loan repayment. 
Microfinance is often defined as financial services for poor and low-income clients offered by different types of service 
providers. In practice, the term is often used more narrowly to refer to loans and other services from providers that 
identify themselves as “microfinance institutions” (MFIs).  It has grown in prominence since Muhammad Yunus started 
the Grameen Bank Project in 1976. The Grameen bank of Bangladesh, which was founded by Mohammad Yunus was 
one of the first microfinance institutions (MFIs). Mohammad Yunus came upon a group of villagers that were unable to 
pay off their debt to a money collector. These methods include group lending and liability, pre-loan savings 
requirements, gradually increasing loan sizes, and an implicit guarantee of ready access to future loans if present loans 
are repaid fully and promptly. It is an important strategy to alleviating poverty in developing countries (Cabraal, Russell, 
& Singh, 2006, as cited by Fikirte, 2011). 
Microfinance institutions are primarily expected to provide various a permanent access to appropriate financial 
services such as credit, savings, micro-insurance, remittances, leasing to low-income clients including consumers 
and the self employed, who traditionally lack access to banking and related services. It is rather an important tool 
for the eradication of poverty (Jegatheesan, Ganesh, & Kumar, 2011). 
In addition to financial services, some MFIs provide social intermediation services such as the formation of 
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groups, development of self confidence and the training of members in that group on financial literacy and 
management. The target group of MFIs are self employed low income entrepreneurs who are; traders, 
seamstresses, street vendors, small farmers, hairdressers, rickshaw drivers, artisans blacksmith etc (Robinson, 
2003). 
One of the most characteristics of microfinance institution is extending loan to the poor and low income people 
through group without asking for collateral, but it serve as collateral. Therefore, in microfinance institutions 
(MFIs) group lending is a lending to groups of members of a community who have come together with the goal 
of reinforcing their creditworthiness. It allows a group of individuals - often called a solidarity group - to provide 
collateral or loan guarantee through a group repayment pledge (Ralph, 2011).  
It is since the 1970s that, group-lending programs have been promoted in many developing countries. Most 
schemes make members jointly liable for the repayment of loans and give subsequent credit only if all members 
of the group have fully repaid. The joint liability but possibly more so, the threat of losing access to future credit 
incites members to perform various functions, including screening of loan applicants; monitoring the individual 
borrower’s efforts, fortunes, and shocks; and enforcing repayment of their peers’ loans (Zeller, 1998). 
According to Ghatak and Guinnane (1999), joint liability leads to an enhanced repayment performance through 
lessening the four major problems facing formal credit institutions in lending to the poor. These problems are: (a) to 
ascertain what kind of a risk the potential borrower is (the problem of adverse selection), (b) to make sure they will 
utilize the loan once made, properly, so that they will be able to repay it (the problem of moral hazard), (c) to find out 
how their  project really did in case they declares their inability to repay (auditing or monitoring) and (d) to find 
methods to force the borrower to repay the loan if she is reluctant to do so (the enforcement problem). 
Even though joint-liability lending have been proposed that various aspects of microcredit’s informational and 
enforcement in loan repayment advantages over other forms of lending, Norhaziah and Mohdnoor (2013) argued 
that examining repayment performance is important because, if borrowers do not repay, then there may not be 
sufficient funds to ensure that the liquidity position of the MFI is maintained. When there is a loss in the MFI 
liquidity due to high levels of non-repayment, the cyclical flow of funds between the MFI and the borrowers will 
be interrupted. The result of this is a reduction in the efficiency of the MFIs operation. To attain financial 
viability, MFI must reach operational self-sufficiency first and in order to attain operational self-sufficiency, the 
MFI must ensure that the operational cost can cover non-financial expenses. This can be achieved by low 
delinquency where the MFI must maintain a low delinquency rate to ensure operational self-sufficiency.  
To sum up, this study was identifying and examining the determinants of group loan repayment in DECSI 
microfinance institution. Specifically, the study has covered groups of borrowers who took loan from DECSI 
microfinance institution to work together in manufacturing activities in Mekelle city, Tigray, Ethiopia from 
2009-2013 operation years. Also, the study has focused on the extent to which group related factors (i.e., 
demographic characteristics of members and group-specific factors), socio-economic factors, and lender related 
factors that may influence group loan repayment performance.  
 
2. EMPIRICAL LITERATURE REVIEW 
Loan repayment performance is affected by a number of socio-demographic of group members, group specific 
factors and lender/institutional factors. While some of the factors positively influence the loan repayment, the 
other factors negatively affect the repayment rate. Regarding to the group loan repayment performance of 
borrowers, several studies have been conducted in many countries by different researchers and summarized 
below.  
2.2.1 EMPIRICAL STUDIES IN OTHER COUNTRIES  
A study undertaken by Bassem (2008), on main factors vulnerable to affect the repayment performance of group 
lending in Tunisia reveal that the repayment is influenced positively by the internal rule of conduct, the same 
business, the knowledge of the other members of the group before his formation, the peer pressure, the self-
selection, the sex, the education, and the non financial services and tie with the loan officer. However, the 
homogeneity, and the marital status are among the main factors acting negatively on the repayment performance 
of credit groups. 
A study on group size and social ties in microfinance institutions conducted by Abbinki, Irlenbusch, and Renner 
(2006) indicated that microfinance programs provided poor people with small loans given to jointly liable self-
selected groups. Follow-up loans provided incentives to repay. In this study they experimentally investigated the 
influence of those features on strategic defaults. Each group member invested in an individual risky project, 
whose outcome was known only to the individual investors. Subjects decide whether to contribute to group 
repayment or not. Only those with successful projects could contribute. The experiment ended if too few repay. 
This investigated group size and social ties effected and observed robust high repayment rates. 
A study conducted by Wenner (1995) on group credit as a means to improve information transfer and loan repayment 
performance in Costa Rica found that members of groups engaged in formal screening with an internal code of regulations 
had a low probability for delinquency, indicating that screening indeed resulted in an informational efficiency gain, a result 
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which is supported by Zeller (1998). 
A study on key factors of joint-liability loan contracts by Alexander and Denitsa (2004) reported that joint liability 
induces a group formation of low risk borrowers. Furthermore, the incentive system leads to peer-measures between 
the borrowers, helping the lender to address the moral hazard and enforcement problem. They also demonstrate that 
the mechanism realizes high repayment rates, if the loan officers fulfill their complementary duties in the screening 
and enforcement process.  
Another study was conducted by Onyeagocha, Chidebelu, Okorji, Ada-Henri, Osuji and Korie (2012) on an 
examination of determinants of loan repayment of microfinance institutions in southeast states of Nigeria reveal 
that out of nine explanatory variables, five variables were found to be significant for the probability of being 
defaulter; that is group size, shocks, training duration, loan size and credit officers experience were significantly 
influencing loan repayment performance of MFIs. However, the remaining four explanatory variables namely, 
gender, age, interest rate and methodology had no significant effect on the loan repayment performance. 
Roslan and Mohd (2009) undertook a study on the determinants of loan repayment among microcredit borrowers 
in Malaysia by dividing determinants into three categories- characteristics of borrowers, characteristics of the 
project or business and the characteristics of the loan. Their result indicated that the probability for loan 
repayment default was influenced by the gender of the borrower, type of business activity, amount of loan, 
repayment period and training. 
Determinants of repayment performance of credit groups in Madagascar were analyzed by Zeller (1996). He 
found that groups with higher level of social cohesion have a better repayment rate. Moreover, the programs that 
provide saving service to their members have a significantly higher repayment rate. 
Julia (1996) studied the determinants of successful group loan repayment in Burkina Faso. This study revealed 
that probability of loan repayment is influenced by effective use of group dynamics (ex ante and ex post peer 
pressure and group solidarity) as well as other factors such as appropriate training and leadership; homogeneous 
groups with sufficient training and reliable leaders had the highest probability of repaying their loans; negative 
externalities like the “domino effect” occur when one or more members of a credit group default due to the 
default of other members; negative influence on repayment occurs when the credit terms and conditions are no 
longer appropriate for each member as credit cycles continue, creating an inherent “matching problem” as group 
lending is repeated over time; and  as loan sizes increase due to the dynamic incentives, preferred loan terms and 
volumes will differ with the consequence that borrowers with smaller loan volumes will reject joint-liability for 
borrowers with higher loan volumes in the same group if the latter run into repayment difficulties. 
An investigation on the key factors that influence loan repayment performance among group clients of microcredit 
institutions (MFIs) in Tanzania have been carried out by Francis and Abel (2009). According to their findings, 
experience, training time, and sanctions have positive and significant effects on loan repayment performance among 
group clients of MFIs. However, transaction costs and group size have negative and significant effects on loan 
repayment performance. 
An investigation by Alessandra, Luke, and Bruce (2005) on the effect of social capital on group loan repayment 
found direct relationship between default and homogeneity, which is the increment in the homogeneity of the 
group members, would lead to the higher repayment. 
As per empirical analysis on determinants of repayment performance in credit groups by Zeller (1998) 
implementation of internal rules and regulations by the group members would lead to the better repayment 
performance that is decrement in the cost of operations of the lender and decrement in the default rate. 
To sum up, as mentioned above, various studies were conducted in various countries (outside Ethiopia) on the 
determinants of group loan repayment performance. Most of these studies have identified major factors 
influencing group loan repayment performance and categorized them as group borrower specific factors (i.e., 
peer monitoring, peer pressure, self-selection, homogeneity, group size, internal rule of regulation), lender 
specific factors (i.e., loan size, training, experiences of credit officers) and socio-economic specific factor (i.e., 
external shocks) that affect principally the loan repayment rate of group borrowers.  
2.2.3.EMPIRICAL STUDIES IN ETHIOPIA 
An empirical analysis on factors that influence the loan repayment performance of the beneficiaries of Addis 
Credit and Saving Institution (ACSI) was made by Fikirte (2011). Accordingly, the study revealed that out of 
twelve explanatory variables, eight variables were found to be significant for the probability of being defaulter, 
that is age and five business types (baltina & petty market, kiosk & shop, services providing, weaving & 
tailoring, and urban agriculture) were important in influencing loan repayment performance of the borrower. In 
addition, sex and business experience of the respondents were found to be significant determinants of loan 
repayment rate. However, the remaining four explanatory variables namely, education level, family size, 
business experience and dependency ratio had no significant effect on the probability of being defaulter. 
An empirical study was conducted by Amare (2005) on the determinants of loan repayment performance of 
smallholder farmers in North Gondar, Ethiopia. A total of 15 explanatory variables were considered in the 
econometric model. Out of these, seven variables were found to significantly influence the repayment performance. 
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These were land holding size of the family, agro-ecology of the area, total livestock holding, number of years of 
experience, number of contacts, sources of credit and income from off-farm activities. The remaining eight 
variables (family size, distance between main road and household residence, purpose of borrowing, loan amount, 
age of borrower, education level, gender of the household head, and expenditure for social festivals) were found to 
have insignificant effect on loan repayment performance of smallholder. 
Another study was conducted by Abraham (2002) on an examination of determinants of repayment status of 
borrowers and criteria of credit rationing with reference to private borrowers around Zeway area who are 
financed by the DBE. The result revealed that having other source of income, education, work experience in 
related economic activity before the loan and engaging on economic activities other than agriculture are 
enhancing loan recovery performance while loan diversion, being male borrower and giving extended loan 
repayment period are undermining factors of loan recovery performance. 
An investigation on the microfinance repayment performance of Oromia Credit and Saving Institution (OCSI) in 
Kuyu has been carried out by Abafita (2003). According to his finding; sex, loan size and number of dependants 
are negatively related to loan repayment and age was found to be positive. Income from activities financed by 
loan, repayment period suitability and loan supervision are positively and significantly related to loan repayment 
performance. Moreover, loan diversion is significant and negatively related to loan repayment rate. 
Generally, numbers of studies were conducted in Ethiopia on determinants of loan repayment performance of 
group based and individual based credit. The results of different studies reviewed above revealed the significant 
factors that probably affect loan repayment as age, sex, business types, business experience, land holding size, 
total livestock holding, loan size, repayment period suitability, loan supervision and loan diversion. 
2.3 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
As it has been reviewed from previous empirical studies in the above sections, factors that affecting group loan 
repayment performance are divided into group-specific factors (i.e. homogeneity, internal rule of regulation, self-
selection and peer pressure), lender/institution related factors (i.e. loan size, suitability of repayment period, loan 
supervision and training), and factors related to overall socio-economic which include external shocks that 
involve different types of family emergencies, sickness, output market loss, major social events, etc. Thus, this 
study has constructed the following conceptual framework (Figure 2.1) based on the empirical findings. Nine 
socio-economic factors, group specific factors and lender specific factors were identified from the empirical 
studies.  
 
As it has been shown in the above Figure 2.1, group loan repayment is affected by different factors which may 
lead group borrowers to default loan or repay it fully. These are socio-demography, group-specific and lender or 
institution factors. The socio-demographic factor is the nature of homogeneity among group members in gender, 
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age, education and marital status, which is expected 
heterogeneity to homogeneity in socio
factors that enforce the repayment of group loan to change as they change; and the lender/ins
those factors that are related with lender/microfinance institution which are expected to affect group repayment 
status.  
 
3. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Based on a preliminary data collected, default rate of last five years on average re
selected groups in the manufacturing sector. In view of that the past five years (2009
loan repayment performance (default rate) at semen branch DECSI microfinance institution is presented in Table 
1.1 and Figure 1.1 below. 
Table 1.1: Summary of loan repayment performance in DECSI for the successive past 5years
Year 2009 
Disbursed  750,000Birr 
Loan Collected  736438.55Brr 
Loan Defaulted  13,561.45Birr 
Default rate 18.10% 
Figure 1.1: Amount of Loan Disbursed and Loan Default
As the above Table 1.1 and Figure 1.1 indicates even if it seems like decreasing in year 2010 operation from that 
of year 2009 ( i.e., 18.10% to 10.29%), the default rate of  group borrowers of semen branch DECSI 
microfinance institution is increasing consequently for the subsequent three years (2011
group borrowers are not paying well their loan successfully from time to time that can badly affect financial 
sustainability of DECSI microfinance institution. 
This is the reason why identifying and analyzing factors that determine group loan repayment performance in 
DECSI microfinance institution was attempted; specifically those borrowers who operate together in 
manufacturing sector in Mekelle city. Besides, acc
microfinance institution, the default rate that the institution is incurring now in group lending has its own 
significant contribution to the cumulative default rate of DECSI. This leads to increase in the ov
default rate that is higher than the rate that the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE) set for all financial institutions, 
i.e., <5 percent (or >95 percent expected to be collected). 
Therefore, whether repayment of group loan is influenced by cer
by group member themselves needs an empirical investigation so that the findings can be used by microfinance 
institution to manipulate its credit programs for the better.
 
4. OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY
The objective of the study was to identify and examine the factors that determine group loan repayment 
performance of Dedebit Credit and Saving Institution (DECSI) microfinance in Mekelle city. 
 
5. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
5.3 RESEARCH APPROACH 
Research design is a plan and procedure for research that span the decisions from broad assumptions to detailed 
methods of data collection and analysis. It is a design and specific methods (data collection, analysis and 
interpretation) that should be used to study a specific top
problem, the researcher’s personal experience, and the audiences for the study (John, 2009). Accordingly, in this 
section research approach, description of the data type, data sources, methods of data
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sample size and methods of data analysis and interpretation are presented. 
Given the objectives and nature of this study, the study has used a mixed approach. The study applied 
explanatory type of research that determines the relationship between the dependent and independent variables 
by using cross sectional data collected from the sample respondents from April 23 to May 14, 2014. 
5.3.1 TARGET POPULATION 
The target populations of this study were group borrowers in the manufacturing sectors and loan officer(s) of 
Semen branch DECSI microfinance institution residing in Mekelle city. 
5.3.2   DATA TYPE AND SOURCES  
This study has used primary data (both qualitative and quantitative types) collected from MSEs group leaders 
and DESCI’s loan officer.   
5.3.3  DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENTS 
This study has used structured questionnaire and depth interview, respectively, in order to collect primary data 
from group leaders and loan officer of DECSI. 
5.3.4  SAMPLING DESIGN 
This study has applied purposive sampling design to select the group leader respondents. It is because group 
leader is the one who looks after members of the group and he/she is assumed to know the required information. 
Besides, the study was census based by taking all groups currently on operation, because the number of groups 
are not large (i.e., they are 34 group leaders) and possibly manageable to take all groups in the selected sector 
(i.e., the manufacturing sector). 
5.3.5 SAMPLE SIZE 
This study has been conducted in DECSI microfinance branch in Mekelle city. Hence, according to the report of 
branch and sub-branch DECSI (2013), the total numbers of group borrowers organized as a cooperative in the 
manufacturing sector and currently on operation were 34. Hence, the study has covered only those 34 groups that 
were functioning in the manufacturing activities and financed by DECSI from 2009 to 2013.  
5.3.6 METHOD OF DATA ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION  
This study has applied the econometric analysis which is logistic regression model (binary) to test the 
relationships among variables. All necessary tests regarding the specification tests have been checked and the 
overall fitness of the model (overall level of significance of the model) was also verified by using the value of 
Pearson Chi-square test. The details are presented in Table 3.3 below. 
DEFINITION OF VARIABLES  
Once the analytical procedure and its requirements are known, it is necessary to identify the potential 
explanatory and dependent variables, and describe their measurements. Different variables are expected to affect 
group loan repayment (the dependent variable). The major variables influencing the group’s loan repayment and 
the direction of their effect are presented and explained below.  
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: GROUP LOAN REPAYMENT (Yi) 
Yi(s) is the binary variable that represents group loan repayment performance. Group loan repayment is defined as the 
act of paying back money previously borrowed from microfinance institution by all group members. It has a value of 1 
if group is non-defaulter otherwise 0, if default. 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Independent variables are variables that are expected and have more explanatory power on the dependent 
variable, i.e., groups’ loan repayment. The independent variables that have been empirically identified and used 
in this study are: internal rule of conduct, peer pressure, homogeneities among member, self selection, external 
shock, loan size, suitability of repayment period, training, and loan supervision. 
Table 3.2: Authors, code, measurement, expected sign and operational definitions of independent 
variables 
Authors Independent 
Variables 
Codes Operational definitions Measurement Expected 
Sign 
Bassem (2008); 
Manfred (1996); 
Zeller (1998) 
Internal rule  IRC It indicates that whether the 
group has internal rule of 
conduct to monitor 
members. It is expected 
that groups that have clear 
internal rules of conduct 
have a significantly higher 
loan repayment. 
Dummy variable 
(1= if it has rule, 0= 
if it hasn’t). 
Positive 
Bassem (2008); 
Ahlin and 
Townsend (2005);  
Wydick (1999) 
Peer pressure PP It refers to the will to 
exercise pressure on 
defaulters’ group members.  
Dummy variable 
(1= if make pressure 
to incite repayment,  
0= if not). 
Positive 
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Bassem (2008); 
Julia (1996); 
Umara and Iqbal 
(2013) 
Homogeneities 
among group 
member  
HOM It implies the homogeneity 
among group member and 
it is measured by average 
age range, sex, marital 
status, education level. The 
higher the homogeneity 
among members the higher 
loan repayment 
Dummy variable 
(1= if members are 
homogenous in 
composition, 0= if 
not) 
Positive  
Bassem (2008); 
Charlotte and 
Lodewijk (2003);   
Manfred (1996);  
Sharma and Zeller 
(1997);  Umara 
and  Iqbal (2013);  
Zeller (1998) 
Self selection  SS It indicates whether 
members are organized by 
their own interest through 
selecting members or by 
another body. 
 
Dummy variable 
(1= if organized by 
their own, 0= if not 
by their own). 
Positive  
Abafita (2003); 
Onyeagocha et al. 
(2012); Umara 
and Iqbal (2013) 
Loan size LS If the loan size was higher 
and enough for the 
intended project, the 
chance of repayment is 
increased. 
Dummy variable 
(1= if loan granted 
is enough for the 
intended 
investment, 0= if 
not enough for 
intended purpose) 
Positive  
Abafita (2003) Suitability of 
repayment 
period 
SRP It is expected that member 
borrowers who find the 
repayment period suitable, 
perform better. Hence we 
expect a positive sign for 
this variable. 
Dummy variable 
(1= if repayment 
time is suitable and 
otherwise 0). 
Positive  
Francis and Abel 
(2009); Julia 
(1996) 
Training  PLT It indicate that pre and after 
loan training for group 
members by DECSI 
microfinance institution.  
Dummy variable 
(1= if there is 
adequate training 
for members, 0 
otherwise). 
Positive  
Abafita (2003) Loan 
supervision  
LSP It refers to continuous 
follow up and supervision 
visit by loan officer to 
evaluate the loan utilization 
and repayment. It is 
expected to have positive 
relationship with loan 
repayment. 
Dummy variable 
(1= if there is timely 
supervision, 0= if 
not). 
Positive  
Manfred (1996); 
Onyeagocha et al. 
(2012); Sharma 
and Zeller (1997) 
External shock  EXS It refers to the sickness, 
market loss, family 
problem, etc of group 
members. 
 
Dummy variable 
(1=if the default 
reason is because of 
external shock, 0= if 
it is not because of 
external shock). 
Negative  
Source: Own Empirical Review (2014) 
Note: The above table is depicted on variable based order. 
5.4 LITERATURE DRIVEN HYPOTHESIS 
The hypotheses are driven after an extensive empirical literature review and the factors that are considered in this 
study are those factors which were considered in the previous studies. These factors are categorized in to group-
specific factors, lender related factors, and overall socio-economic factors by following the classification in the 
empirical studies (Norhaziah & Mohdnoor, 2010; Olomola, 1998; Roslan & Mohd, 2009; Zeller, 1996; 1998). 
The expected effects of these factors on the group loan repayment performance are hypothesized in the following 
section. 
5.4.1 GROUP-SPECIFIC FACTORS   
When loan is not repaid, it may be due to the character of the borrowers, borrowers’ unwillingness and /or 
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                        www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 
Vol.5, No.11, 2014 
 
189 
inability to repay. Homogeneity among group members, self-selection, internal rule of conduct, and peer 
pressure are considered in this study as group-specific factors that affect group loan repayment. The effects of 
these factors are presented below. 
Hypothesis 1: Groups that are homogeneous are predicted to have a higher probability of loan 
 repayment as compared to groups that are heterogeneous. 
Hypothesis 2: Groups that implement internal rule and regulation are predicted to have a  higher 
probability of loan repayment as compared to groups that didn’t  implement internal rule and 
regulation. 
Hypothesis 3: Groups formed with self selection are predicted to perform better in terms of  loan 
repayment as compared to the groups formed by other than member’s self- selection (by an 
outside agent). 
Hypothesis 4: The higher peer pressure exercised by group members on the defaulting  member, the 
higher the group performs good loan repayment. 
5.2.2 LENDER/ INSTITUTION RELATED FACTORS  
Loan defaults arise not only from problems with the borrower but also because of the problems with the lender 
(microfinance institution). Many studies have found that lender characteristics play an important role in 
determining loan repayment of the group. These factors can be loan size, suitability of repayment period, loan 
supervision, and training (Abafita, 2003; Francis & Abel, 2009; Julia, 1996; Onyeagocha et al., 2012; Roslan & 
Mohd, 2009; Umara & Iqbal, 2013). Thus, in this study, the following four lender related variables are 
considered. 
Hypothesis 5: The larger the loan size, the higher the probability of loan repayment by the group 
borrowers.  
Hypothesis 6: As suitable loan repayment period is set for borrowers, the probability of loan repayment 
increases. 
Hypothesis 7: As loan supervision is made regarding loan utilization, the probability of loan repayment by the 
groups is higher. 
Hypothesis 8: As training is available by DECSI MFI, the higher the probability of loan repayment by the 
groups. 
5.2.3 FACTORS RELATING TO OVERALL SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS  
Although there are different socio-economic factors that can affect group loan repayment, this study took the 
critical socio-economic factor that affects group loan repayment, i.e., external shock. 
Hypothesis 9: External shock is predicted to have a significant and negative impact on group loan 
repayment rate. 
5.3 MODEL SPECIFICATION  
In order to investigate the factors that determine group loan repayment, the binary logistic regression model was 
used to examine the relation of each factor with group loan repayment. This model is often used to approximate 
the mathematical relationships between explanatory variables and dichotomous dependent variable. 
The binary logistic regression model is selected due to the nature of the dependent variable. If the dependent 
variable is categorical variable with only two categories (default & non-default valued as 1 & 0, respectively), 
binary logistic regression is appropriate. The logit and the probit model yield similar parameter estimates, but the 
cumulative logistic regression model is preferred because of its comparative mathematical simplicity and more 
meaningful interpretation of odds ratio (Gujarati, 2004). Thus, the model was specified as follows: 
Yi =β0 + β1IR + β2PP + β3HOM + β4SS + β5SRP + β6LS + β7LSP + β8TR - β9EXS …......... (1) 
Where; 
  Yi = repayment performance of loan (1 if the loan was fully repaid within the specified period of the 
loan contract, otherwise 0)  
 β0 = Constant (intercept) 
 εi= disturbance error 
  β1, β2… β9 = slope coefficients of independent variables (the unknown parameters that reflecting the 
impact of change in independent variables). 
 IR = Internal Rule of Conduct; PP= Peer Pressure; HOM = Homogeneity (Composition  of group); 
SS= Self-Selection 
 SRP= Suitable Repayment Period 
 LS = Loan Size; TR= Training; LSP = Loan Supervision;  EXS= External Shock 
MODEL SPECIFICATION TEST  
Before applying the binary logistic regression model, a measure of model fit for binary logistic regression model, 
which is the Hosmer-Lemeshow test of goodness of fit was used to see how well the model fits the data. 
Hosmer- and Lemeshow’s goodness of fit test shows how much predicted values match closely the observed 
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                        www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 
Vol.5, No.11, 2014 
 
190 
values. This test states that the more closely the observed frequencies and predicted frequencies matched, the 
better the fitness of the model. This test is more appropriate test for binary logistic model (Hosmer & Lemesho, 
1980). To test/check goodness fit of the model “lfit” has been conducted. There are no fixed points as to judge 
the model as a best or bad predictor yet it is generally agreed that a model with its overall predictive power of 
three percent or more is good (Anders, Ari, & Magnus, 2006). As indicated in Table 3.3 below, the result of the 
test indicates the p-value (0.1578) is greater than 0.05. Therefore, the null hypothesis (i.e., Ho: The model fits the 
data well) is accepted.  
To detect the data problem for heteroskedasticity, multicollinearity, specification bias and normality tests (i.e., 
hettest, VIF test and OV test), respectively, were conducted. 
Multicollinearity problem is the existence of a “perfect,” or exact, linear relationship among some or all 
independent and explanatory variables of a regression model (Gujarati, 2004). Multi-collinearity diagnostics test 
was done to check the presence of high collinearity among and between the dependent and each independent 
variable. In order to test the existence of multicollinearity problem, the Pearson correlation matrix was utilized 
(‘pwcorr’). As a general rule multicollinearity is a problem when the correlation result is above 0.80 and below -
0.80 (Stock & Watson, 2007) but, as it is shown in the following Table 3.3 the value is under 0.6837 and over -
0.6402. Moreover, Variance Inflating Factor (VIF) was used to check for multi-colinearity problem among and 
between explanatory variables. Chattereje, Hadi, and Price (2000) set the general rule for multicollinearity to be 
a severe problem, if the mean value of VIF exceeds 10 and falls bellow one (i.e., 1< mean VIF<10). However, to 
solve multicollinearity problem, it is advised to drop one of the independent variable that has perfect linear 
relationship with another explanatory variables. Thus, as indicated in the following Table 3.3, VIF result shows 
that there is no perfect collinearity among and between explanatory variables because the VIF value is below 
2.30, only multi-collinearity can be a problem if and only if VIF value exceeds 10. 
The other assumption of the CLRM is the disturbance term Ui appearing in the regression function is 
homoskedastic. That is they have the same variance (E (Ui
2
) = s
2
 where i= 1, 2, …n. Test of heteroskedasticity 
says the null hypothesis that the variance of the residuals is homogeneous. If p-value is very small, i.e., Pr < 0.05 
(at 95% confidence), the null hypothesis will be rejected and accept the alternative hypothesis that the variance is 
not homogenous (Gujarati, 2004). The “hettest” was used to check whether there is heteroskedasticity problem 
or not. As Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test shows in the following Table 3.3, the null hypothesis (i.e., Ho: 
Constant variance) was rejected because the test result showed P-value of 0.1422 (14.22 percent), which is 
greater than the significance level (1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent). Thus, the result indicated that there is 
equal variance among the error terms. Therefore, there was no serious problem of Heteroscedasticity in the 
process of model specification and the model was well fitted.  
Furthermore, the Ramsey RESET test, “ovtest” has been used to check whether the model has omitted variables 
or not. It tests the null hypothesis that Ho: model has no relevant omitted variables. As a decision rule according 
to Ramsey RESET test, a model specification is fit or no omitted variables and ready for analysis if P-value 
stated in P>F greater than the chosen level of significances, i.e., 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent. Accordingly, 
in this study as shown in Table 3.3 below, the result indicated that the model had no relevant omitted variables  
since  the  test  failed  to  reject  the  hypothesis,  i.e.,  Prob.>F  of  0.1168  is found greater than any of the 
significance levels of the specified model of the study. Additionally, the robust regression is carried out and used 
to avoid the aforementioned problem in the data. The various goodness-of-fit measures validate that the model 
fits the data well. Therefore, the value of Pearson Chi-square test shows that the overall goodness-of-fit of the 
model fit the data at less than 1 percent significance level. 
In general, the logit regression model was tested for its fitness by using lfit, hettest, ovtest, pwcorr and VIF, and 
thus, found fit for analyzing the factors that influence loan repayment performance of group borrowers operating 
in the manufacturing sector of the MSEs.  
Table 3.3: Summary of Model Specification Test Results 
Tests  Test Names Null Hypothesis  Ch
2
/F-value Prob>ch
2
/F-value 
lfit  Hosmer-Lemeshow Model fits data 11.85 0.1578 
hettest  Breusch-Pagan/cook-
Weisberg  
Constant variance  2.15 0.1422 
ovtest Ramsey RESET No omitted variables  7.79 0.1168 
vif Minimum= 1.06 Maximum=2.29 Mean=1.68  
pwcorr Minimum= -0.6402 Maximum=0.6837   
Source: Own Survey (2014) 
 
6. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
For the purpose of examining the determinants of group loan repayment performance, group owned MSEs 
operating in the manufacturing sector which has been financed by Dedebit Credit and Saving Institution (DECSI) 
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from 2009- 2013 were taken as a target population for this study. Their total number was 34. Hence, this study 
has used census method to study the factors affecting loan repayment of this sector. Questionnaire was 
distributed for all group leaders of those currently functioning group owned MSE’s. All the distributed 
questionnaires were completed and returned (100 percent response rate). In addition, depth interview was carried 
out with randomly selected five group leaders and DECSI’s loan officer.   
6.1 DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPONDENTS  
In this section, the group leaders’ demographic characteristics are presented with particular reference to age, 
gender, education level and marital status in Table 4.1 below. 
Table 4.1: Demographic Characterises of Respondents 
Category  Number  Percent  
Gender  
Male  29 85.29 
Female  5 14.71 
Total  34 100 
Education level  
Primary  2 5.88 
Secondary  3 8.82 
TVET/Diploma   17 50.00 
Degree  12 35.29 
Total  34 100 
Age  
18-25 2 5.90 
26-35 21 61.75 
36-45 11 32.35 
Total  34 100 
Marital status  
Single  15 44.12 
Married  18 52.94 
Divorced  1 2.94 
Total  34 100 
Source: Own Survey (2014) 
As indicated in Table 4.1 above, among the 34 respondents; 
 5(14.71 percent) of group borrowers were led by females and 29(85.29 percent) of group borrowers 
were led by males. 
 Majority (50 percent) of the group leaders have attended diploma (TVET) followed by first degree 
holder group leaders (35.29 percent). The remaining group leaders, 8.82 percent had secondary, and 
5.88 percent had primary education.  
 Group leaders in the age category of 18-25; 26-35 and 36-45 accounts 5.90 percent, 61.75 percent and 
32.35 percent, respectively.  
 44.12 percent, 52.94 percent and 2.94 percent were single, married and divorced, respectively.  
6.3  RESULTS, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION  
6.2.1 STATUS OF GROUP LOAN REPAYMENT  
To know the loan repayment status, group borrowers were asked whether they have paid back fully or not paid 
successfully in the form of “Yes” or “No” response question. Such an objective response and direct measurement 
of the binary dependent variable (i.e., group loan repayment equal to “1” if groups were non-defaulters and “0” 
otherwise) was used to determine the factors that affect group loan repayment performance in similar studies of 
Bassem (2008), Julia (1996), Manfred (1996), and Zhang and Yoichi (2008). Therefore, both group borrowers 
paid successfully and those did not paid fully were taken into analysis for the identified common explanatory 
variables.  
Out of the total respondents 79.41 percent (27 groups) were able to repay the loan within the given maturity 
period, and hence they are creditworthy. Whereas the remaining 20.59 percent (7) respondents have defaulted on 
their loan and this implies that the borrowers are not creditworthy. In addition, loan officer was asked/ 
interviewed if the institution has any feedback from group borrowers as “What do you think is the reason 
borrowers fail to pay their loans?” Then the officer replied that borrowers often reason out market problem, 
mainly output market, and some borrowers also claim repayment schedule relating to amount and grace period. 
The following Figure 4.1 shows the status of loan repayment by the group borrowers.  
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Figure 4.1: Status of Loan Repayment by the Group Borrowers
It was well discussed in literature that less loan default rate is critical for financial sustainability of MFIs
(Norhaziah & Mohdnoor, 2013). Concerning this matter, annual reports of DECSI indicates that the loan default 
rate for DECSI is increasing from time to time, e
found 20.59 percent default. Therefore, this high loan default rate might endanger the financial sustainability of 
DECSI.  
Reason for Engaging in Group Loan
credit was they had no collateral security that DECSI requires as guarantee for the money loaned. Table 4.2 
below reveals that out of the total group borrowers (34), about 47.06 percent responded lack of collateral secur
required by DECSI (35.29 percent), and easy to get loan in group was their main reason for engaging in group 
loan. 
Table 4.2: Summary of Reasons for Engaging in Group Loan
Group Borrowers 
 Easy to get loan in 
group 
Response (n=34) 6 
Percent of response  17.65 
6.2.2  LOGISTIC REGRESSION  RESULT, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
Group loan repayment has been affected by numerous vari
empirical evidences. Similarly, in this study, the selection and incorporation of the explanatory variables was 
guided by the conceptual framework discussed in the literature review (
given in including variables that are possibly determine group loan repayment performance and tested in this 
study. The binary logistic regression was used to identify the determinant factors and to estimate their potential 
effect of each explanatory variable on the loan repayment rate of group borrowers. The explanatory variables 
include group-specific, lender-specific and socio
from 34 groups owned MSEs functioning in manufacturing sect
Before applying the binary logistic regression model, the 
see the overall fitness of the model. Similarly, before estimating the model, various detection and diagnostics 
tests were done to check for the related econometric problems such as multicollinearity, heteroskedasticity, 
model specification bias, and normality of the data as discussed in chapter three. The results of these tests 
indicated that the model is fitted, no severe multicollinearity, a
Table 4.8 below presents the binary logistic regression results, i.e., shows the odd ratios (probability of loan non
default/probability of loan default), the p
model.  
                               
) 
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Source: Own Survey (2014) 
specially in the group lending (DECSI, 2013). This result also 
: one of the major reasons, as stated by respondents, to engage in group 
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Source: Own Survey (2014) 
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Table 4.3: Logistic Regression Estimation Result 
Variables  Odd ratios   p>|z| Marginal effects (dy/dx) 
Group-Specific Factors     
Composition (homogeneity)   8.442986 0.059*** 0.2226957 
Internal rule and regulation 0.3988835 0.178 -0.0475766 
Initiation (self-selection) 16.95498 0.005* 0.3228618 
Peer pressure 9.846844 0.035** 0.2067954 
Lender-Specific Factors     
Loan size 0.1757597 0.027** -0.0782067 
Suitability of repayment period 18.34454 0.005* 0.3036484 
Loan Supervision  0.2123275 0.117 -0.1000537 
Training 1.556051 0.707 0.0252288 
Socio-Economic Factor     
External shock 0.1201008 0.061*** -0.201596 
Statistics:  
Number of observations  =         34                                            Prob > chi
2
     =     0.0000 
 Wald chi
2
(9)                   =      38.78                                          Pseudo R
2
      =     0.6816 
Source: Own Survey (2014) 
*, **, *** indicate level of significance at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent, respectively. 
6.3INTERPRETATION OF ESTIMATION RESULT (MODEL OUTPUT) AND HYPOTHESIS 
TESTING  
The interpretation of estimation results (i.e., logistic regression output) of the explanatory variables are presented 
bellow followed by tests of research hypotheses. 
As Table 4.3 above shows the most influential explanatory variables from group specific factors in determining 
group loan repayment performance are group composition, group initiation and peer pressure found significant 
as they have an estimated odds ratio of 8.44 (P-value of 0.059); 16.95 (P-value of 0.005), and 9.85 (P-value of 
0.035), respectively; from lender specific factors suitability of loan repayment period and loan size are found 
significant in influencing dependant variable (loan repayment) with an odds ratio of 18.34 (P-value of 0.005) and 
0.176 (P-value of 0.027), respectively. Furthermore, from socio-economic factor external shock is found 
significant in determining group loan repayment performance with an odds ratio of 0.12 (P-value of 0.061). 
H1: Groups that are homogeneous are predicted to have a higher probability of loan repayment as compared 
to groups that are heterogeneous. 
The first group specific variable found significant in this study is group composition. In line with expectation, 
holding other factors constant, homogeneous group composition has more likelihood of loan repayment. 
Consistent to the expectation, the result shows that the odd ratio of 8.44.  This indicates that the probability of 
group loan repayment is 8.44 times higher for homogeneous group borrowers than heterogeneous group 
borrowers. The marginal effect of this variable is 0.223 indicating that the probability of group loan repayment 
for homogeneous group increases by 22.30 percent as compared to heterogeneous group. Considering this a 
number of justifications have been given as to why homogeneous group borrowers pay their loan in time higher 
than heterogeneous group. In this study, group borrowers are graduate students from universities and colleges 
found in the same age range, education level and gender. This may help them to understand each other on an 
issues including successful repayment of their loan in time. Therefore, the first research hypothesis which says 
“groups that are homogeneous are predicted to have a higher probability of loan repayment as compared to 
groups that are heterogeneous” is accepted at 10 percent level of significance.   
Thus, it can be concluded that the probability of group loan repayment increases as group borrowers become 
homogeneous because groups with homogeneous members showed the highest percentage of loan repayment as 
compared to groups with heterogeneous members. 
H2: Groups formed with self selection are predicted to perform better in terms of loan repayment as compared 
to the groups formed by other than member’s self-selection (by an outside agent). 
Group Initiation (Self Selection) is another group specific variable which is found significant at 1percent. It 
refers to the way in which group members formed to engage in his or her current business activity. It is 
hypothesized that screening and selecting of creditworthy borrowers is more effective with groups that are 
formed by the members themselves than the groups that depend on the intervention from an outside agent to be 
formed. Their loan default is lower for groups that are formed on their own.  
In line with this expectation, the variable initiation has a positive relation with loan repayment and is statistically 
significant at 1percent level of significance. The possible reason as to why the groups initiated by the members 
themselves have performed better in repaying the loan is that the group members can obtain at low cost 
information regarding the reputation, indebtedness and effort of a group member to ensure the repayment of the 
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loan. The group members might be able to access complex and sensitive information about the group member.  
The odd ratio of 16.95 for group initiation (self-selection) indicates that the probability of loan repayment 
increases by 16.95 times higher for group borrowers who are initiated by the members themselves than group 
borrowers who are initiated by an outside agent or promoter. Similarly, the marginal effect of 0.3229 shows, 
other things remain constant, the probability of loan repayment increases by 32.29 percent for those groups who 
are initiated by the members themselves as compared to those groups who are initiated by an outside agent or 
promoter. Hence, the hypothesis “groups formed with self selection are predicted to perform better in terms of 
loan repayment as compared to the groups formed by other than member’s self-selection (by an outside agent)” 
is accepted at 1 percent significance level.  
From this result, it can be concluded that the probability of group loan repayment performance increases as far as 
group formation is based on member’s self-selection because group members can easily identify the 
creditworthy group member. 
H3: The higher peer pressure exercised by group members on the defaulting member, the higher the group 
performs good loan repayment. 
Peer pressure has a positive relation with loan repayment and is statistically significant at 5 percent level of 
significance. The odd ratio shows that the probability of loan repayment is 9.85 times higher for the group which 
makes peer pressure in incitement of repayment than groups which do not employ the technique. The marginal 
effect of 0.207 implies, holding other variables constant, the probability of repaying the loan increases by 20.70 
percent for those group borrowers who exercise peer pressure on defaulting members as compared to those 
borrowers who do not employ peer pressure on defaulting members to enforce loan repayment.  
As a result, the hypothesis which states “the higher peer pressure exercised by group members on the defaulting 
member, the higher the group performs good loan repayment” is accepted at 5 percent significance level. 
Therefore, it is possible to say that existence of peer pressure among group members proves to be positive and 
meaningfully contribute to improve the group loan repayment performance. 
H5: As suitable loan repayment period is set for borrowers, the probability of loan repayment increases. 
From the lender specific factors, suitability of loan repayment period found significant at 1 percent level. It refers 
to the time period during which the entire loan must be repaid. It was predicted that suitable loan repayment 
period is positively correlated with group loan repayment because it was assumed that if borrowers find the 
repayment period suitable, they can utilize the loan proceeds effectively for the intended purpose than those who 
regard the period of repayment unsuitable.  
The odd ratio of 18.34 for suitability of loan repayment period indicates the probability of loan repayment 
increases by 18.34 times higher for group borrower found suitable loan repayment period as compared to group 
borrowers who did not found suitable repayment period. Similarly, the marginal effect of 0.304 shows that, 
keeping other factors constant, the probability of group loan repayment increases by 30.40 percent for group 
borrowers that found suitable loan repayment period as compared to those who didn’t found suitable repayment 
period. Therefore, the research hypothesis which says “as suitable loan repayment period is set for borrowers, 
the probability of loan repayment increases” is accepted at 1 percent level of significance.  
Thus, it is possible to conclude that those groups (MSEs) who seek suitable repayment period were found to be 
good performers in loan repayment as compared to those MSEs who do not found suitable repayment period. 
H6: The larger the loan size, the higher the probability of loan repayment by the group  borrowers. 
The other lender specific variable found significant at 5 percent is loan size. The result indicates that the loan 
size has a negative effect on the probability of group loan repayment. Similarly, the odd ratio shows that the 
probability loan repayment decreases by 0.1758 times higher for group borrower that perceived the loan amount 
is enough as compared to group borrowers who did not satisfied with the loan amount that borrowed, other thing 
kept constant. The marginal effect of this variable is -0.0782 indicating that the probability of group loan 
repayment for group borrower that perceived the loan amount is enough decreases by 7.82 percent as compared 
to group borrowers who did not satisfied with the loan amount that borrowed. Here the perspective to this 
variable might be due to the larger the loan, the higher is the borrower’s cost of delaying payment. A larger loan 
is more difficult to repay if allowed to accumulate especially where there are compounding interest and sanctions. 
This factor puts pressure on the borrower to reduce late payments and serious default. In addition, this may be 
due to the fact that, the higher the loan size provided to the borrowers, the higher to invest in long term 
investment that need longer time to give back benefits to the owners. Therefore, this may enforce group 
borrowers to seek longer grace period to make the first repayment and lower amount of loan repayment per 
period when repayment starts and gradually increases with the income level. Hence, the research hypothesis 
which says “the larger the loan size, the higher the probability of loan repayment by the group borrowers” is 
rejected at 5 percent level of significance. Therefore, the alternative hypothesis (the lower loan size, the higher 
the probability of loan repayment by the group borrowers) may be accepted. 
Therefore, group borrowers who supposed that granted loan size is enough to conduct the intended investment 
poorly perform loan repayment than those group borrowers agreed granted loan size is not as much enough to 
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carry out investment. 
H9: External shock is predicted to have a significant and negative impact on group loan repayment rate. 
Holding other factors constant, the probability of group loan repayment decreases by 0.12 times higher for group 
faced external shock (such as family problem, market losses, social events, etc.). Similarly, the marginal effect of 
(-0.202) shows the probability of group loan repayment decreases by 20.20 percent for those groups facing 
external shock as compared to those groups who did not encountered the shocks, all other factors kept constant. 
Based on this, the hypothesis that assumes “external shock is predicted to have a significant and negative impact 
on group loan repayment rate” is accepted at 10 percent level.  
From this result, it can be concluded that as number of group member facing shocks increase, the probability of 
group loan default increases.  
However, the following hypotheses are found statistically insignificant (Table 4.3): 
H4: Groups that implement internal rule and regulation are predicted to have a higher probability of the 
loan repayment as compared to groups that didn’t implement internal rule and regulation. 
H7: As loan supervision is made regarding loan utilization, the probability of loan repayment by the groups 
is higher. 
H8: As training is available by DECSI MFI, the higher the probability of loan repayment by the groups. 
7. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
7.3  CONCLUSIONS  
The study was carried out to identify and analyze the factors that influence group loan repayment, particularly 
those groups owned MSEs functioning in manufacturing sector and who are beneficiaries of DECSI 
microfinance, Mekelle branch. Therefore, based on the research findings, the following conclusions are drawn.  
 It has been found that about 79.41 percent of group borrowers were non defaulters and about 20.59 
percent of them were defaulters. It was also found that the basic reasons as to why members want 
engaging in group borrowing are lack of collateral security to take loan individually when they want, 
required by DECSI, and easy to get loan in group than on individual basis. 
The logit regression model revealed that among the nine (9) explanatory variables which were hypothesized to 
influence group loan repayment, six (6) variables were found to be statistically significant at 1 percent, 5 percent, 
and 10 percent levels of significance.  
 Group composition, group initiation or formation, peer pressure and suitable repayment period had 
positive and significant effect on group loan repayment performance, while loan size and external shock 
had negative and significant effects. The remaining three variables (i.e., internal rule and regulation, 
loan supervision and training) were found to be statistically insignificant in affecting group loan 
repayment performance. 
 The marginal effect of group composition, group initiation and peer pressure, i.e.,  0.223; 0.3229; and 
0.207, respectively, indicated that the probability of group loan repayment increases by 22.30 percent; 
32.29 percent; and 20.70 percent for homogeneous group; for those groups who are initiated by the 
members themselves; and for those group borrowers who exercise peer pressure on defaulting members 
as compared to their respective counterpart group borrowers, respectively, keeping other thing constant.  
 The marginal effect of suitable repayment period, i.e.,  0.304 indicated that, keeping other factors 
constant, the probability of group loan repayment increases by 30.40 percent for group borrowers that 
found suitable loan repayment period as compared to those who didn’t found suitable repayment period. 
Whereas loan size found negative and statistically significant influence with the marginal effect of -
0.0782 indicating that the probability of group loan repayment for group borrower that perceived the 
loan amount is enough decreases by 7.82 percent as compared to group borrowers who did not satisfied 
with the loan amount that borrowed. 
 The marginal effect of external sock, i.e.,  -0.202 indicated that, holding other factors constant, the 
probability of group loan repayment decreases by 20.20 percent for those groups facing external shock 
(such as family problem, market losses, social events, etc.) as compared to those groups who did not 
encountered the shocks. 
7.4 RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the above conclusions drawn, the following recommendations are forwarded: 
 As per the discussion held with the loan officer of DECSI, one reason for low loan repayment by MSEs 
is wrong credit perception of borrowers. That is borrowers consider loan as donation and opted-not-to 
pay back. Therefore, DECSI should create awareness among clients before disbursing loan through 
giving short training about its objectives (i.e., its source of funds and convincing them the advantages 
why they are required to repay back the borrowed fund) that the loan has to be repaid so that DECSI 
can have sustainable and viable operation. This enables DECSI to reach millions of poor people in the 
region thereby eradicating poverty. 
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 DECSI should consider homogeneous group, self initiated groups, and peer pressure groups (i.e., 
groups with strong social ties) while screening group borrowers. This could reduce significantly loan 
default and DECSI is sustaining since creditworthy borrower can be selected from the very beginning. 
 In order to make group borrowers run effective business, the availability of sufficient loan size is one 
important factor. Thus, DECSI should compare loan size with the business proposal of the client before 
loan disbursement and should revise the rule and regulation of the institution based on the current 
economic condition of the country. 
 DECSI should set business and income based suitable loan repayment period (i.e., enough grace period, 
amount repayment per period, and repayment time) as per the type of businesses in the sector.  
Most of these groups operating in the manufacturing sectors have witnessed lower loan repayment performance. 
This sector has lower loan repayment due to shortage of market for their output and frequent increase in price of 
inputs that the sector uses. Similarly, result from descriptive statistic and logit regression model revealed that as 
number of group member facing shocks increase, the probability of group loan default increases. Therefore, 
especial attention is needed by the concerned stakeholders (DECSI, Bureau of Trade and Industry, and Regional 
MSEs development agency) in creating market linkage to sell their output; and sustainable supply of inputs at 
fair price until these group owned MSEs build capacity to operate on their own. Especial attention is also needed 
for this sector because the sector can play decisive role in reducing unemployment level in the city since the 
sector is labor intensive. 
Finally, although internal rules and regulations, loan supervision, and training are found statistically insignificant, 
their important influence on loan repayment should not be ignored. Thus, continuous follow up and supervision 
is important for loan repayment; help the MSEs develop an internal by laws; and training on loan management 
should be given to the MSEs. Also, loan officers should give the clients the necessary orientation, follow-up, and 
counseling services.  
7.5 LIMITATION AND SUGGESTION FOR FURTHER RESEARCH  
There will be many factors (such as experience of group borrowers in the sector, interest rate, group size, and 
lack of appropriate working place for both manufacturing and selling outputs) beside the factors that are 
mentioned in this study which hinder ability of borrowers (groups) to fulfill their loan repayment obligations as 
per the scheduled repayment periods. In an attempt to see the repayment status of group borrowers in Mekelle 
city, Tigray, this study has gone some steps forward.  
Addressing the group leaders only for the study may affect the quality of the study because of biasness even if 
the assumption was that the leader is the one who looks after all members. Thus, further research may be 
conducted by addressing sample members of the group borrowers, than only the leader. 
This study has focused only on the manufacturing sector. Thus, similar study may be conducted in the 
remaining/other sectors (i.e., construction, urban agriculture, and service and trade).  
Finally, this study finding may not be used to generalize about the determinants of the group loan repayment 
because the study has focused on only the manufacturing sector and confined only to the Mekelle city. The study 
has only through a light on the factors that determine group loan repayment performance. Thus, comprehensive 
and comparative studies are recommended in order to have holistic picture on the group loan repayment 
performance by considering wide area and all the MSEs subsectors. 
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